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Immigration Law
by Bianca N. DiBella *
and Andrew J. Mueller **
This Article surveys cases from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit from January 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020,
in which immigration law was a central focus.1 During this time, the
Eleventh Circuit decided hundreds of cases on immigration law related
issues. The cases discussed herein are those that annunciate important
issues, add flourishes to the existing standards and rules, offer important
reminders of precedent and practice points, or otherwise illuminate the
boundaries of the Eleventh Circuit’s immigration jurisprudence. This
Article discusses: (1) the standard of judicial review of administrative
decisions; (2) the procedural and jurisdictional limitations in
immigration cases; (3) asylum relief; and (4) other important
immigration issues. Finally, it concludes with potential trends to watch
in the Eleventh Circuit’s next term.

* Associate, Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Florida (B.A., 2014); Vanderbilt University Law School (J.D., 2017). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Associate, Troutman Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Furman
University (B.A., 2014); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2020). Member, State Bar
of Georgia. The authors would like to thank Teri Townsend, Research Librarian, Troutman
Pepper Hamilton Sanders LLP; University of Nevada-Las Vegas (B.A. 2001); University of
the Pacific-McGeorge School of Law (J.D., 2004); Florida State University (M.L.I.S., 2007).
Her invaluable assistance made this effort possible. Thank you for all you do, Teri.
1 For an analysis of immigration law during the 2018 period, see Emily Wright,
Immigration Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 1083 (2019). Lawyers from Troutman Pepper
Hamilton Sanders LLP, including the principal author of this Article, represented asylum
seekers before Eleventh Circuit panels during this term. Of note, Troutman Pepper
attorneys represented Abdirahman Salad Warsame before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit this term. See generally Warsame v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 796
F. App’x 993, 996 (11th Cir. 2020), discussed infra.
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Little has changed this term regarding the Eleventh Circuit’s
standards of review for administrative proceedings. The Eleventh
Circuit, despite some debate, is generally unwilling to review (or rule
contrary to) an opinion issued by a U.S. official with congressional
authorization to adjudicate immigration cases outside of the usual
bureaucracy, such as the U.S. Attorney General and Secretary of
Homeland Security.2
In Bourdon v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,3 the Eleventh
Circuit declined to review an administrative decision arising under 8
U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i),the Adam Walsh Act. 4 Bourdon was convicted of
a specified offense under the Act causing the government to flag and
review any applications he filed for immigrant status on behalf of
immediate family.5 Years later, he married a citizen of Vietnam and
submitted an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on her behalf.6 When the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
determined that Bourdon did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he posed no risk to his wife’s safety, USCIS denied his petition, leading
to a federal lawsuit that landed before the Eleventh Circuit.7
The dissent would have reviewed the Secretary of Homeland Security’s
decision denying Bourdon’s application.8 In her dissent, Judge Beverly
Martin9 argued that the statute’s language granting “sole and

See generally Bourdon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 983 F.3d 473 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id.
4 Id at 474. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), “any citizen of the United States” may file
a petition with the Attorney General seeking immigrant status on behalf of his non-citizen
immediate family members. This congressional provision was modified in 2006 to except
citizens who have been “convicted of a specified offense against a minor.” Pub. L. No.
109-248, § 402 (2), 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I)). Pursuant to
this exception, the statute allows a citizen with such a conviction to petition the Secretary
of Homeland Security, who may in his or her “sole and unreviewable discretion determine[]
that the citizen poses no risk to the” noncitizen on whose behalf the citizen petitions.
Bourdon 983 F.3d at 476. Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, on aliens and nationality, appears to
preclude judicial review of discretionary immigration decisions. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or non-statutory), . . . no court shall
have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the
Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter
to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security . . . .”).
5 Bourdon, 983 F.3d at 476.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 476–77.
8 See generally id.
9 Judge Martin recently announced her retirement from the Eleventh Circuit. See
Katheryn Tucker, Judge Beverly Martin Tells Why She's Leaving the 11th Circuit, DAILY
2
3
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unreviewable discretion” to the Secretary to make no-risk
determinations was not the same as an “explicit preclusion of judicial
review;” therefore, the Act contained no “explicit jurisdiction-stripping
language” in Judge Martin’s estimation, and the court was free to review
the USCIS decision denying Bourdon’s petition.10 Judge Martin also
found no implicit preclusion of judicial review of a USCIS decision in the
statute.11 The standard to review USCIS decisions, according to her
dissent, was dictated by the Accardi doctrine: “[W]hen final agency action
is committed to agency discretion,” as in this case, according to Judge
Martin, “an agency must abide by its own regulations,” which failure
thereof constitutes “the basis for judicial review of [its] actions.”12
Judge Britt Grant, concurring with the majority, found that the
statute’s “sole and unreviewable” language applied to this case and other
appeals of decisions issued pursuant to the Act.13 The most persuasive
fact, in Judge Grant’s opinion, was that “every circuit to consider this
issue has disclaimed jurisdiction over claims like Bourdon’s.”14
Accordingly, she joined the majority of the court sitting en banc, and
declined to exercise jurisdiction in the context of the statute.15 As a result,
the Eleventh Circuit is unlikely to adopt the dissent’s argument that the
Accardi doctrine should apply in USCIS appeals—or that they should
entertain those appeals at all.
REP. (May 20, 2021), https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/2021/05/20/judge-beverlymartin-tells-why-shes-leaving-the-11th-circuit/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2021). Judge Martin's
resignation in 2021 will mark the departure of an outspoken critic of immigration policy
and proponent of shifts in rhetoric around non-citizens in an effort to humanize them and
their circumstances. See Jennifer Doherty, Circuit Judges Spar Over The Term 'Alien' In
Opinions, LAW 360 (Jul. 8, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1401539/circuit-judgesspar-over-the-term-alien-in-opinions (last visited Aug. 19, 2021).
10 Id. at 481 (citing Bourdon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (DHS), 940 F.3d 537, 546 n.
4 (11th Cir. 2019); id. at 548 (“[T]he [statute] . . . contains its own jurisdiction-stripping
provision . . . .”)).
11 Bourdon, 983 F.3d at 481–82.
12 Id. at 482–83 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Andrus, 588 F.2d 1383, 1386 (5th Cir. 1979)
(adopted by Eleventh Circuit pursuant to Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down before October 1, 1981)); Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 569, 605 (2006)).
13 Id. at 475 (quoting Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480, 486 (2015); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I)).
14 Id. (citing Bakran v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 894 F.3d 557, 562–64 (3d Cir.
2018); Gebhardt v. Nielsen, 879 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2018); Privett v. Sec’y, Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 865 F.3d 375, 381(6th Cir. 2017); Roland v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr.
Servs., 850 F.3d 625, 628–30 (4th Cir. 2017); Bremer v. Johnson, 834 F.3d 925, 929–31 (8th
Cir. 2016)).
15 Id.
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II. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
Often, federal court review of administrative immigration decisions
serves as a procedural safeguard that can save or revive an immigration
case. As the American Immigration Counsel opines, “[f]ederal court
review adds an important layer of protection—courts can catch
inadvertent government mistakes and help ensure that the government
is properly interpreting and applying the immigration laws.”16 But
procedure is a double-edged sword:
At the same time, . . . the immigration removal system lacks nearly all
of the procedural safeguards we rely on and value in the U.S. justice
system. Immigrants facing deportation have neither a right to
appointed counsel nor a right to a speedy trial. Harsh immigration
laws may apply retroactively, unlawfully obtained evidence is often
admissible to prove the government’s case, and advisals of
fundamental rights are given too late to be meaningful. Moreover,
after receiving an order of removal, immigrants have limited ability to
challenge their deportation in court. Given the potentially severe
consequences of removal—which can range from permanent
separation from family in the United States to being returned to a
country where a person fears for his life—the lack of procedural
safeguards deprives countless individuals of a fair judicial process.17

This term, with few exceptions, procedure worked against applicants
for asylum. withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
against Torture (CAT).18 This part details some of those cases.
A. Exhaustion
While not annunciating a new principle of law, the Eleventh Circuit
reminded litigants of an old precedent: it will not entertain an appeal of
an issue not raised before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).19

16Background on Judicial Review of Immigration Decisions, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL,
(June
1,
2013),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/background-judicial-reviewimmigration-decisions (last visited Apr. 22, 2021).
17 Two Systems of Justice: How the Immigration System Falls Short of American Ideals
IMMIGRATION
COUNCIL
(March
2013),
of
Justice,
AMERICAN
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/aic_twosystemsof
justice.pdf. These issues go beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it bears keeping
them in mind when considering whether, and to what extent, procedure works against the
interests of justice that underpin the American legal system.
18 See discussion infra on Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 85, 113.
19 See generally Srikanthavasan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 828 F. App’x 590 (11th Cir. 2020).
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Adding a flourish to that rule, even if the BIA considers a given issue sua
sponte, the Eleventh Circuit will not entertain it if the petitioner did not
himself raise it.20 In Srikanthavasan v. U.S. Attorney General,21
Srikanthavasan, a Sri Lankan native, petitioned for review of the BIA’s
dismissal of his application.22 Srikanthavasan challenged, among other
things, the BIA’s decision adopting the IJ’s finding that Sri Lanka was
“able and willing to protect him from persecution” and rejecting his claim
for relief under the CAT.23
The court declined jurisdiction to review Srikanthavasan’s appeal on
this point, citing the oft-cited provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252,24 which mandates that the
judiciary cannot review a claim where the petitioner has failed to exhaust
“all administrative remedies available to [him] as of right.”25 The court
elaborated that “the exhaustion doctrine exists to ‘avoid premature
interference with the administrative processes’ . . . . Reviewing a claim
‘that has not been presented to the [BIA], even when the [BIA] has
considered the underlying issue sua sponte, frustrates these
objectives.’”26 As a result, the court dismissed Srikanthavasan’s CAT
claim, making clear that it will not overturn the BIA’s decision on an
issue it decided to take up and adjudicate.27
B. Procedural Due Process
Srikanthavasan also petitioned the Eleventh Circuit to review
whether he was afforded proper due process.28 Despite Srikanthavasan’s
claim that the IJ improperly curtailed his counsel’s questioning, the court

Id. at 594.
Id. at 590.
22 Id.at 594.
23 Id. at 596.
24 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2005).
25 Srikanthavasan, 828 F. App’x at 596 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). Several other
cases this term have resulted in denied petitions for review due to a party’s failure to
exhaust an issue. See e.g., Landaverde v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 828 F. App’x 613, 617 (11th Cir.
2020) (declining jurisdiction to consider argument that petitioner’s uncle’s military service
was central reason for gang’s threats to harm him and his family because petitioner failed
to raise the argument before the BIA); Andres-Mendez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 829 F. App’x 444,
447–48 (11th Cir. 2020) (failing to exhaust IJ’s determination that particular social group
was circularly defined and that petitioner was ineligible for CAT relief and withholding of
removal).
26 Srikanthavasan, 828 F. App’x at 596 (quoting Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006)) (emphasis in the original)).
27 Id. at 597.
28 Id. at 598.
20
21
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was not convinced.29 The IJ told Srikanthavasan’s counsel to ask only a
“few” questions in light of the documentary evidence he had already
submitted.30 The court held the IJ’s decision was within its discretion—
the right to a “fair [hearing] in a fair tribunal” had not been curtailed,
and he had not been “deprive[d] of his right to present a fair case.”31 Put
simply, an IJ need not “address every piece of evidence.”32
C. Discretionary Relief from Removal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Eleventh Circuit recounted its precedent regarding jurisdiction
to hear appeals of discretionary decisions under the INA in Patel v. U.S.
Attorney General.33 Although, when the court had interpreted a
predecessor version of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B),34 it had drawn a
distinction between “appellate review of discretionary decisions” and
“review of non-discretionary legal decisions that pertain to statutory
eligibility for discretionary relief,” its prior precedent became “unmoored
from the current statutory language.”35
The court overruled all prior precedent regarding appeals under
§ 1252, and held that it is “precluded from reviewing ‘any judgment
regarding the grant[] of relief under [8 U.S.C. §§] 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b,
1229c, or 1255’ except to the extent that such review involves
constitutional claims or questions of law.”36 In supporting its opinion, the
court detailed extensively the history of Congress’s regulation of
immigration and the Executive Branch’s discretionary powers in the
same arena since 1875.37 Its conclusion was simple: “Congress made a
deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive Branch, and specifically to
the Attorney General, the authority to allow deportable aliens to remain
in this country in certain specified circumstances.”38 In this
circumstance, the court determined that Congress stripped it of its
Id.
Id.
31 Id. at 598–99.
32 Id. at 599.
33 971 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2020).
34 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (2005).
35 Patel, 971 F.3d at 1262.
36 Id. (punctuation omitted).
37 See generally id. at 1265–69. The detail included in the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion
exceeds the scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that litigants advancing cases
controlled by § 1252 of the INA would be well-served in reviewing Patel.
38 Id. at 1266. “[E]ligibility in no way limits the considerations that may guide the
Attorney General in exercising her discretion to determine who, among those eligible, will
be accorded grace.” Immigration and Naturalization Serv. (INS) v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519
U.S. 26, 31 (1996).
29
30
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jurisdiction to review administrative factual determinations under
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).39 As a result, the court overruled prior inconsistent
case law, requiring “at least a colorable constitutional violation” to invoke
jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims or questions under
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).40
III. ASYLUM
Part III provides a sample of cases that highlight the finer points of
the analysis for asylum relief.41 In particular, this term, several
applicants were denied asylum for want of credibility and corroboration
of past persecution, failing to demonstrate a nexus between the alleged
persecution and a protected ground, failing to define a cognizable
particular social group (PSG), and being unable to demonstrate a
well-founded fear of future persecution.
A. Credibility
Absent corroborative evidence, consistency in an applicant’s story is
key to his or her success. In Ratnam v. U.S. Attorney General,42 the
Eleventh Circuit upheld a finding that petitioner Ratnam lacked both
corroborative evidence and consistency.43 Ratnam claimed that he and
his family were beaten by the Sri Lankan army; that the army killed his
sister, brother, and father; and that he was detained by the army and
brutally tortured.44 He also testified to interacting with immigration
officials in various countries on different occasions before entering the
U.S., none of which was reflected on his passport.45 The court held that,
because the record contained some inconsistencies and because Ratnam
did not bring evidence to corroborate his minority ethnicity, substantial

Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1275–76 (quoting Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 1281, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“A petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that Congress chose to remove simply by
cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in constitutional garb.”)).
41 To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that he is a “refugee”—
someone who is unable or unwilling to return to and avail himself of the protection of the
country of his nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A) & 1101(a)(42)(A); see generally Sanchez Jimenez v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2007).
42 831 F. App’x 928 (11th Cir. 2020).
43 Id. at 929.
44 Id.
45 Id.
39
40
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evidence supported the BIA’s and IJ’s adverse credibility determination,
precluding asylum relief.46
Similarly, in Garcia v. U.S. Attorney General,47 petitioner Garcia was
unable to persuade the IJ and BIA that his story of persecution was
credible.48 The IJ found, and the BIA agreed, that Garcia could not
provide sufficient detail regarding his political activities in Nicaragua to
corroborate his version of events—namely, the persecution he allegedly
suffered at the hands of the Sandinista regime.49 The medical records
which documented his treatment in Nicaragua did not attribute his
injuries to the alleged persecution; he failed—in the IJ’s and BIA’s
estimation—to submit testimony from his brother who was living in the
U.S. at the time of Garcia’s appeal and the two letters he provided from
Nicaraguan contacts did not deliver sufficient detail about his alleged
persecution.50 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the IJ’s and BIA’s findings,
holding that substantial evidence supported their determination that
Garcia was not credible and did not sufficiently corroborate his
testimony.51
Often, the Eleventh Circuit will decline to even consider the merits of
these arguments if the applicant’s story fails to meet the credibility “sniff
test.” In Uddin v. U.S. Attorney General,52 reviewing both the IJ’s and
the BIA’s findings to the extent of their agreement, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the applicant had not met his burden of showing that their
decisions were “not supported by specific, cogent reasons
or . . . substantial evidence.”53 Because the applicant provided “evasive,
vague and internally inconsistent testimony” when questioned, the IJ
rendered an adverse credibility determination (and the BIA affirmed).54
“Without . . . credible testimony,” the court concluded, the applicant
could not “sustain his burdens for asylum, withholding of removal or CAT
relief,” and the court declined to reach the merits of the case.55
Ratnam and Garcia, taken together, underscore the importance of
crafting the most robust and detailed application for asylum possible in
the first instance, and bolstering it with detailed, noncontradictory, and

Id. at 932.
831 F. App’x 450 (11th Cir. 2020).
48 Id. at 451.
49 Id. at 452.
50 Id. at 454.
51 Id.
52 829 F. App’x 484 (11th Cir. 2020).
53 Id. at 486.
54 Id. at 487.
55 Id. at 488.
46
47
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corroborating evidence of persecution. Of course, the applicant’s
testimony must first be deemed credible, unlike the applicant in Uddin.56
B. Nexus
The court resolved several asylum applications by finding that the
applicant did not adequately demonstrate a nexus between the
persecution alleged and the protected ground. For example, in
Castillo-Perez v. U.S. Attorney General,57 Castillo-Perez petitioned the
Eleventh Circuit for review of her dismissed asylum appeal, arguing that
she was entitled to asylum and withholding of removal based on being a
member of her family and having suffered threats against her and her
brother by neighbors who believed the siblings had poisoned their
father.58 Castillo-Perez’s principal argument on appeal was that the IJ
erred in finding that she did not establish a nexus between the alleged
persecution and her membership in her proposed PSG, her family.59
Because the threats were made against her and her brother, and not her
entire family, and because no actual harm had been done, the court
agreed that substantial evidence supported a finding that no nexus
existed between the alleged persecution and the protected ground.60
But, in at least one notable case, Warsame v. U.S. Attorney General,61
the Eleventh Circuit remanded petitioner Warsame’s case because the IJ
and BIA did not consider “the possibility of [a] mixed motives” analysis
with respect to establishing the nexus of his persecution and protected
ground.62 Warsame suffered countless death threats, bomb attacks,
kidnapping and torture at the hands of al-Shabaab, a terrorist group in
Somalia.63 He sought asylum based on implied and actual political
opinion and PSG, which the IJ, and later BIA, denied.64 The Eleventh
Circuit held that if the IJ determined Warsame’s claim failed because
al-Shabaab’s reasons for their attacks and threats lacked the requisite
identity of motive, then necessarily the IJ’s analysis did not consider a
mixed motives analysis, which was improper.65 Practically speaking, this
means that applicants who seek asylum under multiple protected
Id. at 487.
829 F. App’x 456 (11th Cir. 2020).
58 Id. at 457.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 458.
61 796 F. App’x 993 (11th Cir. 2020).
62 Id. at 1007.
63 Id. at 996.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1007.
56
57
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grounds do not necessarily need to delineate which instance of
persecution at a given point in time coincides with one protected ground
or the other. In other words, it is possible that one instance of
persecution—or several, in Warsame’s case—can relate to more than one
protected ground.
C. Particular Social Group
Defining a viable PSG continues to be an uphill battle. A PSG must
be: (1) composed of “a group of persons all of whom share a common,
immutable characteristic”; (2) “defined with particularity”; and (3)
“socially distinct within the society in question.”66
In Alvarado v. U.S. Attorney General,67 Alvarado and her daughters
petitioned for review of the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions that their two
proposed PSGs were not cognizable.68 First, they proposed “Honduran
women who are unable to leave a domestic relationship”; and second,
they proposed “Honduran women who are viewed as property.”69 The BIA
agreed with the IJ that the proposed PSGs both fail because the first was
“impermissibly circularly defined” and the second did not lack the
requisite particularity.70 Retroactively applying Matter of A-B-, in which
then Attorney General William Barr held that applicants must “establish
membership in a particular and socially distinct group that exists
independently of the alleged underlying harm,” the Eleventh Circuit
agreed that Alvarado’s first proposed PSG was overbroad and circularly
defined because its members were defined by their alleged underlying
harms.71 As for the second proposed PSG, the court determined it to be
overbroad and unclearly defined.72 Alvarado thus serves as a cautionary
tale for litigants: PSGs must be carefully defined, and even the best PSG
may be susceptible to a retroactive application of the Attorney General’s
latest interpretation of immigration law.
Whether an applicant’s family unit could meet this definition to
qualify as a viable PSG had previously remained an open and hotly

66 Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation
marks omitted).
67 829 F. App'x 492 (11th Cir. 2020).
68 Id. at 493–94.
69 Id. at 494.
70 Id. at 496 (quoting A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 Op. Att’y Gen.(2018)). For more about
agency interpretation of PSG, see M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 BIA (2014). For a
more thorough discussion of A-B-, see Alvarado, 829 F. App’x at 497–98.
71 Alvarado, 829 F. App’x at 498. (quoting A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 317).
72 Id. at 499.
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debated question.73 In 2019, then Attorney General Barr weighed in.74 In
Matter of L-E-A-, Barr overturned the BIA’s finding that the asylum
seeker’s family status—specifically, that he was a member of his father’s
immediate family—constituted a PSG.75 Family, he concluded, could not
be said to meet the three-part PSG definition, at least not in this case.76
Here, Barr found that the BIA had inappropriately relied upon the
parties’ agreement that the applicant’s family constituted a PSG instead
of conducting its own fact-based inquiry; so, the decision had to be
reversed.77 Whether Matter of L-E-A-, foreclosed family ties as a PSG was
left an open question in 2020.
This term, the Eleventh Circuit weighed in. In Castillo-Perez, the court
was faced with a PSG defined as family membership.78 Without deciding
whether Castillo-Perez alleged a satisfactory PSG, the BIA assumed,
arguendo, that she had and held instead that she did not show a nexus
between that PSG and the persecution she claimed.79 The Eleventh
Circuit held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination
that petitioner failed to establish a nexus.80 The court issued its opinion
after Attorney General Barr released his opinion in Matter of L-E-A-, and
thus, its choice not to address the BIA’s assumption that Castillo-Perez’s
family constituted a PSG may signal its willingness to consider family
membership as a viable PSG, or at least distinguish Matter of L-E-A-.
The court further signaled its likely willingness to allow family (or,
“kinship ties”) to succeed as a potentially viable PSG in Warsame,
discussed supra.81 There, Warsame asserted his PSG was comprised of
members of his family—specifically, he claimed he was persecuted by
Somalian terrorist group al-Shabaab “because of his father,” who was a
police officer and known in their community for his ties to the
government and vocal opposition to al-Shabaab.82 The IJ and BIA had
sua sponte created different PSGs (which they found were not viable),
and thus, did not consider the more appropriate kinship ties PSG.83 The
See, e.g., Warsame, 796 F. App’x 993; Castillo-Perez, 829 F. App’x 456.
See generally L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 Op. Att’y Gen. (2019). Because this case falls
outside of the scope of this Article, it’s holding has been provided only to aid in the
interpretation of cases bearing on the same issue in 2020.
75 Id. at 582.
76 Id. at 594.
77 Id. at 586.
78 Castillo-Parez, 829 F. App’x at 456.
79 Id. at 457.
80 Id. at 458.
81 796 F. App’x 993, 1002.
82 Id. at 1005.
83 Id. at 1005–06.
73
74
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Eleventh Circuit remanded for the BIA to review his proposed kinship
ties PSG given Matter of L-E-A-, which was issued after oral argument
but before the court rendered its opinion.84 On remand, the IJ granted
Warsame asylum on all grounds in light of Matter of L-E-A- and per the
Eleventh Circuit’s instruction. Therefore, future asylum applicants and
counsel should note and consider employing an effective “mixed-motives”
analysis when arguing that multiple grounds for asylum apply.
D. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
In Srikanthavasan, whether Srikanthavasan demonstrated a wellfounded fear of future persecution was a central issue.85 Srikanthavasan
argued that the IJ and BIA failed to address whether Tamils, the ethnic
minority to which Srikanthavasan belonged, would be persecuted if they
returned to Sri Lanka.86 The IJ found that Srikanthavasan had not
sufficiently demonstrated that returning Tamils would be persecuted in
Sri Lanka, and the BIA concluded that he had failed to prove that
returning Tamil asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of
persecution.87 The court held that this “reasoned consideration” of
Srikanthavasan’s claim hung on “basic logic.”88 Because the IJ and BIA
found that a “specific subset of Tamils were not subject to a pattern or
practice of persecution,” Srikanthavasan had logically failed to prove
(and the IJ and BIA implicitly determined) that there was not a “pattern
of prosecution against all Tamils.”89 As a result, his proffer of general
evidence of Tamil mistreatment had failed to prove a well-founded fear
of persecution.90
This case reveals the Eleventh Circuit’s laser focus on the petitioner’s
proof and to what extent the lower courts considered it. If the IJ and BIA
have given “reasoned consideration” to the petitioner’s argument and
evidence, the court will look beyond the IJ’s explicit judgment and uphold
findings “implicit” to the IJ’s decision.91 But if they have not, the court
will remand for further consideration.92 And, importantly, the Eleventh
Circuit and lower Immigration Courts have signaled willingness to

Id. at 1006.
Srikanthavasan, 828 F. App’x at 592.
86 Id. at 595.
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 Id.
89 Id. (emphasis in original).
90 Id. at 596.
91 Id.
92 See Warsame, 796 F. App’x 993.
84
85
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consider a “mixed-motives” analysis—that one or more instances of
persecution can be connected to multiple valid PSGs.
IV. OTHER COMMON ISSUES
Because immigration law is so multifaceted, there exists a
corresponding multiplicity of areas that don’t fit neatly into any of the
aforementioned categories. Those are detailed here, including
illustrations of some of the more notable cases.
A. Habeas Corpus
In Patel, discussed supra, the Eleventh Circuit detailed the history of
habeas review, among its several other pronouncements.93 Reminding
litigants that habeas review is still a valid option for relief from removal,
the court explained that, despite some of the limitations on review of
discretionary Executive Branch decisions, the limitations on judicial
review written into certain statutes by Congress “[do] not bar jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the general habeas statute.”94
The Eleventh Circuit also reminded litigants this term that habeas
review and judicial review should not be confused.95 In Bourdon,
discussed supra, Judge Grant criticized Judge Martin for relying on
habeas review cases to bolster her dissent regarding judicial review of an
administrative decision.96 As a result, Bourdon serves as a simple
warning to litigants: Choose your case law carefully.
In Mehmood v. U.S. Attorney General,97 Mehmood appealed a district
court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas.98 Principally, Mehmood
argued that his prolonged pre-final-removal-order detention per 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c), absent a bond hearing, violated the Due Process Clause.99 The
IJ, and later the BIA, declined to entertain Mehmood’s arguments for
deferral of removal.100 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that
Mehmood’s initial appeal of this decision before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was never fully resolved; nevertheless,
because he had been removed to Pakistan and was “no longer detained
by or in the custody” of the U.S. government, his appeal was moot.101
971 F.3d 1258, 1270–71 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 1271.
95 Bourdon, 983 F.3d at 475.
96 See id.
97 808 F. App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2020).
98 Id. at 911–12.
99 Id. at 912.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 912–13.
93
94
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Because the crux of his (or any) habeas petition was relief from detention,
and such relief could no longer be provided, the court held it had
“nothing . . . to remedy, even if [it] were disposed to do so.”102 Accordingly,
a habeas petition will not hold water if the petitioner has been removed.
B. Naturalization
In Bueno v. USCIS Kendall Field Office,103 Bueno appealed a district
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of USCIS.104 Because
Bueno failed to directly challenge one of the grounds upon which the
lower court relied—that she used a fraudulent Costa Rican passport to
obtain entry into the U.S.—and because she failed to properly raise her
second argument—that she was admitted pursuant to prior
administrations’ policies, which should be afforded deference—the court
refrained from considering these items.105 While the court hinted that
there might have been some merit to Bueno’s naturalization argument,
she could not overcome that argument’s procedural deficiencies.106
Naturalization can also be contingent on the citizenship of the
applicant’s parent.107 In Pierre v. U.S. Attorney General,108 David Pierre,
a Haitian citizen, petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for review of the BIA’s
decision affirming the IJ’s order finding him removable and ineligible for
derivate citizenship.109 The case depended on whether Pierre’s parents
had separated by the time his mother became a naturalized citizen.110
According to the Eleventh Circuit, “every circuit and the board have
agreed that legal separation requires some degree of formal government
action—whether a divorce decree or some other government action short
of divorce.”111 The court agreed with the BIA that Pierre had not
adequately proven his parents were separated by offering middle school
records reflecting declarations of his mother and father as these were not
“formal government actions” supporting separation.112 Furthermore,
Id. at 913–14 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998)).
809 F. App’x 651 (11th Cir. 2020).
104 Id. at 652. Bueno filed a petition for naturalization in 2012, and USCIS denied it,
finding that she had not been lawfully admitted under 8 U.S.C. § 1429, the lawful
permanent residence statute, because she obtained entry to the U.S. by fraud under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
105 Id. at 656.
106 Id. at 655.
107 See, e.g., Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 813 F. App’x 418 (11th Cir. 2020).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 419.
110 Id. at 420–21.
111 Id. at 421.
112 Id. at 422.
102
103
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because of the dearth of federal common law defining “legal separation,”
the court affirmed the BIA’s decision to rely on Florida common law and
Haitian common law, the places of his parents’ divorce and marriage,
respectively, to define it.113 Accordingly, in a naturalization appeal based
upon derived citizenship, petitioners would be well-advised to track down
these difficult-to-find documents from either their home country or the
place of their parents’ naturalization or divorce.
This term, when seeking naturalization via Form N-400, the Eleventh
Circuit cautioned that an applicant must include all criminal charges,
even those that were dismissed as “legal nullit[ies].”114 Appealing the
district court’s criminal conviction, based, in part, upon the ruling he was
required to disclose a Brazilian murder charge on his Form N-400, De
Souza argued that the charge, which had been dismissed on statute of
limitations grounds, was a legal nullity under Brazilian law and did not
need to be disclosed.115 Reviewing the ruling de novo, the Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court.116 Contrasting Garces v. U.S.
Attorney General,117 in which the court held that a past conviction
vacated for procedural defects did not count as a “conviction” for
immigration and naturalization purposes, 118 the Eleventh Circuit noted
that “United States law governs whether the statements De Souza made
on his Form N-400 violated § 1015(a).”119 The naturalization application
asks about “charges,” and per U.S. law, that encompasses all criminal
113 Id. (citing Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2004) (While normally
immigration law is “construed according to a federal, rather than state,
standard[,] . . . [w]here, as here, there is no extant body of federal common law in the area
of law implicated by the statute, we may use state law to inform our interpretation of the
statutory language.”); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956), superseded by
statute, 17 USCS § 304, as recognized in Broad. Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396
F.3d 762, 768 (6th Cir. 2005). (“The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question,
but that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state, rather than federal
law . . . . This is especially true where a statute deals with a familial relationship; there is
no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.”)
(citations omitted); Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although
uniformity is an important concern in federal statutory interpretation, . . . where the term
in question involves a legal relationship that is created by state or foreign law, the court
must begin its analysis by looking to that law.”) (citation omitted); Wedderburn v. INS, 215
F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “the INS determines the existence, validity, and
dissolution of wedlock using the legal rules of the place where the marriage was performed
(or dissolved)”)).
114 See U.S. v. De Souza, 811 F. App’x 575, 579–81 (11th Cir. 2020).
115 Id. at 580–81.
116 Id. at 581.
117 611 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2010).
118 Id. at 1339.
119 De Souza, 811 F. App’x at 581.
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charges—even those that were dismissed under noncontrolling Brazilian
law.120
V. CONCLUSION
This Article—surveying the law of 2020—would be remiss not to refer
to the unique and far-reaching effects of the COVID-19 global pandemic
or the change in presidential administrations. As early as March 15,
2020, the Eleventh Circuit began restricting attorneys’ and litigants’
access to the court’s buildings.121 Shortly thereafter, on March 23, 2020,
the Eleventh Circuit ordered oral arguments to be conducted by audio or
teleconferencing “[w]here feasible.”122 The well-documented global
uncertainty surrounding the virus, which requires no citation, sent the
Eleventh Circuit, as well as the IJ, BIA, and courts elsewhere in flux,
delaying immigration litigation in the process.
Likewise, on January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden was inaugurated
as the forty-sixth U.S. President, replacing Donald J. Trump. Biden’s
early days in office have been hallmarked by several executive orders
repealing Trump era orders and policy, including three targeting
immigration: (1) an order appointing a task force to “find ways to reunite
children in the U.S. with their parents[] who were deported without
them”; (2) an order addressing the asylum backlog and aimed at
examining how to replace the Migrant Protection Protocols program; and
(3) an order mandating agencies to review recent immigration
regulations and guidance.123 While immigrant advocates called for more
action, the orders signal an about-face of the last administration’s
policies.
As the courts adjust to the realities of post-COVID-19 litigation and as
the Biden Administration evaluates and potentially repeals more Trump
era immigration orders, regulations, and guidance, there will likely be an
uptick in immigration litigation. But even amid increased access to the
courts, immigrants face steep precedential barriers to asylum,
naturalization, and other relief rooted in immigration law.
Id.
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